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Аннотация
Frege pointed out that in the context of attitude verbs, substitution of apparently co-referring terms fails. Some Russellians deny that such substitution failures occur, even when the reports are read de dicto, positing that the apparent failure is to be explained on pragmatic grounds. This allows them to maintain that the apparently co-referring terms are genuinely co-referring. But I follow Frege in maintaining that the apparent failure is genuine and should be accounted for semantically.
Frege explains the failure of substitution of apparently co-referring terms in a way compatible with maintaining the principle of the substitutivity of identicals, namely by positing a distinction between sense and reference and a systematic shift in reference — from customary reference to customary sense — in the context of attitude verbs. Frege thus denies that the apparently coreferential terms at issue in these failures of substitution are genuinely co-referential in the context of attitude verbs (though they may be co-referential outside such contexts; and if so, they would also be co-referential in reports read de re). I maintain the principle of the substitutivity of identicals and accept Frege’s distinction between sense and reference but deny that there is a shift in reference in the context of attitude verbs, instead following Davidson in maintaining semantic innocence.
The solution is instead to accept a truism of contemporary cognitivist linguistics: We do not all speak the same language, even if we are members of the same language community and so mostly succeed in communicating using certain sounds, shapes, and gestures bearing certain family resemblances. We simply turn the failures of substitution into a criterion for the individuation of languages — a move in fact anticipated by Frege himself. Further support for the solution is provided by consideration of a paradox from Church.